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CAESAR'S WIFE REVISITED*-JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION AFTER THE 1974
AMENDMENTS
The due process clause of the Constitution guarantees every liti-
gant the unqualified right to have controversies determined by an
impartial tribunal.' When prejudice on the part of a judge has pre-
vented a fair and impartial hearing, the litigant is entitled to a new
trial before a different judge.2 In federal courts, relief from possible
judicial prejudice also may be available to litigants upon a motion
urging disqualification of a judge.3 Recent changes in the federal
disqualification statutes4 have precipitated reexamination of recusal
5
principles in view of the goals sought by the new legislation and the
results obtained Some commentators have urged the institution of
automatic disqualification procedures in federal courts as the best
method for assuring an impartial hearing. 7 An examination of present
* "Courts, like Caesar's wife, must be not only virtuous but above suspicion."
U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 82, 245 P. 1074, 1075 (1926).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950);
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
2 See, e.g., Killilea v. United States, 287 F.2d 212 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
969 (1961).
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). This remedy is available
in federal courts as well as in most state courts. For a listing of the type of law each
state has, see Project, Disqualification of Judges For Prejudice or Bias - Common Law
Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REv. 311, 347 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Oregon Project].
Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 278 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
455 (Supp. V 1975)), amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). See text accompanying notes
19-29 infra.
5 Although originally there was a technical distinction between disqualification
and recusal-the former meaning exclusion by force of law, the latter, withdrawal at
the judge's discretion-this distinction is no longer generally recognized. See Frank,
Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CON r-MP. PROB. 43,
45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Frank]. Accordingly, the terms are used interchangea-
bly in this article.
6 See, e.g., Note, 7 CUM. L. RPv. 185 (1976); Comment, The Elusive Appearance
of Propriety: Judicial Disqualification Under Section 455, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 104
(1975); Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28 U.S.C. Section 144
and Revised Section 455, 45 FoRaHAM L. REv. 139 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FORDHAM
Note]; Comment, Disqualification of Federal District Judges - Problems and
Proposals, 7 SaroN HALL L. Rlv. 612 (1976); Comment, Disqualifying Federal District
Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. Rav. 109 (1975); Note, Judicial Ethics - Recusal
of Judges - The Need for Reform, 77 W. VA. L. Rxv. 763 (1975).
1 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 5; Oregon Project, supra note 3; FORDHAM Note,
supra note 6; Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50
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disqualification law as applied, in conjunction with the problems
inherent in the proposed automatic procedures, however, compels a
contrary conclusion favoring the present statutory scheme.
The federal judicial disqualification statutes derive from the early
English common law,8 where pecuniary interest and blood relation-
ship were grounds for recusal of judges? This common law practice
was adopted in the eighteenth century American courts 0 and was
codified in 1792." The fundamental principle behind disqualification
was expressed by Lord Coke, "aliquis non debet esse judex in propria
WASH. L. REV. 109 (1974); Note, Judicial Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Need for
Reform, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 763 (1975).
As early as 1250, a statement of the common law rule for disqualification was
set out by Bracton:
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for
refusal is a suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge
be a blood relative of the plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or
friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his kinsman or a member of his
household, or a table-companion, or he has been his counsellor or his
pleader in that cause or in another, or in any such like capacity.
6 BRACTON, LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIE 249 (Twiss ed. 1883).
The basis for civil law disqualification statutes dates from the Code of Justinian:
"Although a Judge has been appointed by imperial power yet because it is our pleasure
that all litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who
thinks the judge under suspicion, to recuse him before issue joined, so that the cause
go to another .. " Corpus Juris Civilis, Codex, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16, translated in
Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923).
9 Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements In Judicial Machi-
nery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1973) (statement
of John P. Frank) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
"o At the time of the colonization of America, English recusal law had contracted
from the broad earlier standard, see note 7 supra, to where the only basis upon which
a judge could be disqualified was financial interest. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
646 (K.B. 1609). Blackstone seems to indicate that in the eighteenth century there were
no grounds for disqualifying a judge, 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361, but this
statement has been interpreted as merely rejecting all bases for disqualification besides
that of financial interest. Frank, supra note 5. For an American case from this early
period, see Board of Justices v. Fennimore, 1 N.J.L. 190 (1793).
" Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278. In the original federal statute, the
only grounds for disqualification were an interest in the litigation, or representation of
either party as counsel. Id. These strict standards resulted from the influence of the
early English common law recusal practice. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE
L.J. 605, 609-10 (1947). In the nineteenth century, when the British attitude became
progressively more liberal and flexible, the English courts expanded the disqualifica-
tion requirement to include even judges who had only a remote proprietary interest in
a case. The federal standards for disqualification did not follow the English pattern of
liberal development. See generally Oregon Project, supra note 3; Note, Disqualification
of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1966).
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
causa, " "no man may be a judge in his own case."' 2
Present standards for disqualification in federal courts are man-
dated by 28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455. Section 144 has remained
virtually intact since its original enactment in 1911,' 3 and provides
that a district court judge shall disqualify himself when a litigant files
an affidavit alleging facts sufficient to indicate bias. 4 Although the
facts alleged in the affidavit must be accepted as true, the judge still
must pass on the sufficiency of the allegations to determine whether
bias can be established from those facts.'" Section 455 is of much
broader application and requires disqualification in certain instances
upon judicial initiative.'" Prior to 1974, this section provided that a
judge must disqualify himself from a proceeding when he had a sub-
stantial interest in the case,' 7 he had been a material witness or of
,2 1 CoKE, INSTITUTES *141a. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), where
Justice Black uses similar language.
"2 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090. The statute was altered
slightly in 1949 when the phrase "in any case" replaced "as to any judge," which
resulted in limiting litigants to one recusal motion per case rather than per judge. Act
of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 80-72, c. 139, § 65, 63 Stat. 99 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
144 (1970)).
" 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). The statute further provides that the affidavit must
state facts and reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and must be accom-
panied by a certificate of counsel stating that the motion is made in good faith. Id.
Each party to a case is limited to one such affidavit, and an additional safeguard
provides a strict time requirement for filing. Id. See generally Note, Disqualification
of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REv. 736 (1973); Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. RFv. 1435 (1966).
'3 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 32 (1921). Although the challenged judge
may not pass on the truth of the alleged facts, he may decide whether the, affidavit
meets the procedural requirements of the statute and whether the facts alleged give
"fair support" to the charge of bias. Id. at 33-34.
" Congress originally enacted § 455 in 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 20, 36
Stat. 1090, and revised it in 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat.
908. The 1948 revision extended applicability of the section to all federal judges instead
of district judges alone; the phrase "in which he has a substantial interest" replaced
"concerned in interest in any suit;" the additional recusal ground of relationship to a
party's attorney was added; slight phraseology changes were made.
17 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974). The "substantial interest" contem-
plated in § 455 usually was construed as financial interest. In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 486 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); United States v.
Bell, 351 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1965); cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966); Kinnear-Weed
Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 441
F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). In cases where the interest is
such that every judge would be disqualified for interest, no judge should be disquali-
fied. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1920) (federal judge challenged the constitu-
tionality of taxing the income of federal judges); United States v. Whitsel, 543 F.2d
1176 (6th Cir. 1976) (Supreme Court and all other sitting judges named defendants);
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counsel in a case, or, in his opinion, he was so closely related to or
associated with any party or attorney as to render it improper for him
to sit in the case. 8
Congress amended section 455 in 19749 upon determining that the
existing statutory standards were inadequate in view of conflicting
standards in the revised American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct.2" As amended, the statute not only enumerates specific sit-
uations in which disqualification is mandatory, 21 but also provides
Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (entire federal
judiciary named as defendants).
18 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
1" Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (Supp. V 1975)), amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).$10 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1). See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351, 6352 [hereinafter cited as
House Report]. The newly revised (1972) ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT requires
disqualification of a judge whenever "his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1). Even before the canon revision,
ethical and statutory standards conflicted; the Canon required disqualification for
"personal interest," while the statute mandated recusal for "substantial interest." The
earlier statutory standard required a judge to disqualify himself in cases where he had
a "substantial interest," had been of counsel, had been a material witness, or was
connected with a party or his attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Prior to revision, the
Canons provided that: "a judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative
is a party," Canon 13, and "a judge should abstain from performing or taking part in
any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved," Canon 29.
In discussing the 1974 changes to § 455, the House Report pointed out the difficul-
ties of having two sets of standards:
The existence of dual standards, statutory and ethical, couched
in uncertain language has had the effect of forcing a judge to decide
either the legal issue or the ethical issue at his peril. He was occasion-
ally subjected to a criticism by others who necessarily had the benefit
of hind sight. The effect of the existing situation is not only to place
the judge on the horns of a dilemma but, in some circumstances, to
weaken public confidence in the judicial system.
House Report, supra, at 6352. The language of the Report apparently was directed to
Senate rejection of the nomination of Judge Haynsworth to the Supreme Court in 1969.
See Frank, supra note 5, at 51. Haynsworth had declined to disqualify himself in
several cases where potential conflict of interest problems were present; Haynsworth
had held stock in parties' parent companies or in contractually related companies.
Although his actions conformed with prevailing judicial interpretation of the current
statutory standards, Haynsworth's involvement in these cases prompted the Senate to
disapprove his nomination. HAYNSwoRTH REPORT, S. ExEc. REP. No. 91-92, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
21 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (Supp. V 1975). The statute provides that a judge shall
disqualify himself where: he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party; he
has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; in private practice he served as
lawyer in the matter; a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 2 2 This "appearance to
the community" test replaced the "substantial interest" standard of
the former statute.2n In addition, the appearance test was intended
to overrule the so-called "duty to sit" gloss given to the earlier version
of section 455.24 Under the "duty to sit" rule, a judge faced with a
close question on disqualification was urged to resolve it in favor of a
"duty to sit." Finally, the amendments eliminate in most situations
the possibility of counsel waiver of judicial disqualification.
2
1
Congress amended section 455 in order "to broaden and clarify the
grounds for judicial disqualification."2 However, judicial interpreta-
tion of the amended statute since its effective date28 generally does
such association as a lawyer in the matter; he has been a material witness in the
matter; while governmentally employed he participated in such capacity as counsel,
advisor or material witness in the matter, or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case; he has a financial interest in the outcome; he has any
other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome; he is related within
the third degree to a person who is (1) a party, (2) counsel, (3) interested in the
outcome, or (4) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. Id. Where any of the
foregoing situations obtain, the judge may not accept a waiver by counsel of his dis-
qualified status. Id. at § 455(e). Waiver is permissible, however, when the only basis
for disqualification is that the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned."
Id. See Id. at 455(a).
2 Id. at § 455(a).
2 The statutory language has been explained as creating an "appearance of im-
propriety" test in both the ABA Judicial Code, Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of
Judicial Conduct at 60-61 (1973), and in § 455 as amended in 1974, 1973 Hearings,
supra note 9, at 40 (statement of John P. Frank).
21 House Report, supra note 20, at 6355.
1 The case most often cited as an example of the "duty to sit" rule is Edwards v.
United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965),
where Judge Rives stated:
[W]hether a judge should recuse himself in a particular case depends
not so much on his personal preference or individual views as it does
on the law, and that, under the law, I have no choice in this case ...
In the absence of a valid legal reason, I have no right to disqualify
myself and must sit.
See Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1968); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States
v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 924 (1968); In re Union
Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Tucker v.
Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950).
26 The purpose of prohibiting waiver is to avoid placing counsel in a position where
he must agree to waive a claim of prejudice in order to avoid alienating a judge in
future matters. 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see
note 21 supra.
1 House Report, supra note 19, at 6351.
2 The Act became effective on December 5, 1974, and by its terms was not applic-
1977] 1205
1206 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
not reflect attainment of these goals. Although the courts considering
the statute 9 have attempted to apply a broadened standard for dis-
qualification, the varying interpretations and inconsistent results
able to trial proceedings commenced before that date, nor to appellate proceedings
where the entire case had been submitted before that date. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-512, § 3, 88 Stat. 1609. This provision has been interpreted by the Fifth
Circuit to allow application of the amendments by an appellate court to trial proceed-
ings that had terminated completely before the Act's effective date. Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976);
Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 924 (1976). But see In re VEPCO, 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976); text accompa-
nying notes 73-74 infra.
-" Since the effective date of the statute, several district courts have confronted
the problem of disqualification but have failed to apply the new amendments. A black
female judge presiding over Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), a class action by women against a law firm allegedly engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices, was urged to recuse herself on the basis of her sex, race, and back-
ground of dedication to civil rights and affirmative action. Id. at 4-5. The judge denied
the motion for disqualification on the basis of pre-amendment law, including the "duty
to sit," and wholly failed to consider the amendments or their implications. Id. at 2.
For a description of the melee between the judge and the attorneys in this case, see
Kwitney, Bar None: Law Firm is Stung by Hiring-Bias Suit Filed by Woman Lawyer
and Heard by Woman Judge, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1975, at 22, col. 1. The application
of the amendments to this case might have been technically improper since the original
complaint was one of a dozen filed with the EEOC in 1972-two years prior to the
effective date of the statute. However, the amendments logically should apply because
the controversy did not reach the federal courts until 1975. Nevertheless, apparently
neither the parties nor the judge raised the issue of the amendments, and so the judge
may have proceeded oblivious to her obligation under the revised § 455(a) to recuse
herself where her impartiality may reasonably be questioned. See text accompanying
note 16 supra.
Similarly, in United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the judge
relied solely upon pre-amendment case law, including "duty to sit" cases, to find the
allegations in defendant's affidavit insufficient to warrant recusal. Id. at 1332. The
defendant had alleged prejudice primarily upon the basis of the judge's unsympathetic
attitude toward the defendant who had a serious heart condition. Id. See also Andres,
Mosburg, Davis, Elam, Legg & Bixler, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 418 F. Supp.
304 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (where pre-amendment law was also relied upon).
Finally, in a North Carolina district court, the judge not only failed to apply
present recusal law, but also failed to rely upon pre-amendment law. In Reddy v.
Jones, 419 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D.N.C. 1976), the judge's law clerk had accepted an
employment offer from a law firm representing one of the litigants in an action before
the court. The judge cited his customary practice of immediately taking clerks off cases
in which future employers are involved and stated that he had never had difficulties
with such matters before. This was the sole authority for his decision, for he cited
neither cases, nor statutes, nor Judicial Canons in his terse one-page opinion. Indeed,
the court appeared disgruntled that such an allegation was made at all: "[M]otions
to disqualify should not be lightly filed; this one is not lightly considered by the court;
it has no merit and is denied." 419 F. Supp. at 1391.
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indicate that the objective of clarification was not achieved.
In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,30 the Fifth Circuit
considered a section 144 motion for disqualification as well as the
provisions of the amended section 455. Plaintiffs in Davis sought to
have the trial judge recuse himself on the basis of remarks directed
at plaintiffs counsel in a court opinion for a different case decided
one month earlier.31 The plaintiffs section 144 affidavits asserted that
these remarks reflected the judge's belief that the civil rights claim-
ants represented by plaintiffs attorneys did not have valid griev-
ances, but rather had been solicited by the attorneys to present un-
warranted claims. 3 The trial court denied the motion for disqualifica-
tion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, applying the traditional strict
section 144 standard. The court of appeals held that because the bias
alleged did not stem from an extra-judicial source outside the context
of the immediate case, 33 that the alleged bias was not personal but
judicial in nature, and hence, insufficient to require disqualifica-
tion.34 Moreover, since the affidavit asserted that the judge was
biased against an attorney rather than a "party," 35 the court found
the recusal remedy inappropriate.36
Upon considering the 1974 amendments, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that Congress did not intend the amendment of section 455 to
overrule judicial interpretations of section 144 requiring bias to be
"extra-judicial" and against a "party." 37 The court interpreted the
"might reasonably be questioned" language of section 455 to mean
only that the prior subjective standard for determining judicial bias
517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
"' The comments about plaintiffs' counsel appear in the court's opinion in Robin-
son v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731, 733-34 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
31 517 F.2d at 1053-54.
2 Traditionally, the bias alleged "must stem from an extra-judicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case." United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
This personal/judicial dichotomy has been extended so that any "inferences drawn
from prior judicial determinations are insufficient grounds for recusal. . . ." United
States v. Partin, 312 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (E.D. La. 1970). Accord, United States v.
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976); Scarrella v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan, 536 F.2d
1207 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 237 (1976); United States v. Bernstein, 533
F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976), (all three cases were pre-amendment cases).
31 517 F.2d at 1051.
33 The language of § 144 states that whenever a "party" to any proceeding files a
sufficient affidavit alleging that the judge has a personal bias against him or in favor
of an adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
11 517 F.2d at 1050-51.
Id. at 1052.
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had been replaced by an objective standard. 3 This interpretation
ignored the drafters' intent to mandate recusal whenever there is even
an appearance of partiality.39 Under this appearance test, the techni-
cal requirements that were formerly necessary to render allegations
sufficient, such as the extrajudicial and party requirements, are no
longer determinative. 0 Rather, courts now must look beyond the suf-
ficiency of allegations to the broader standard of whether the pro-
ceedings have an appearance of impartiality. 1 The Fifth Circuit,
however, failed to interpret the amendments in this manner, causing
them to fall short of their intended goal of broadening the statutory
standard."
In another Fifth Circuit case involving the new amendments,
Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar,43 the court
again construed section 455 narrowly. The plaintiff, who claimed
discrimination against blacks in the administration of the Alabama
bar examination, moved that the trial judge recuse himself because
he had been president of a county bar association during a period
when blacks were barred from membership. 4 Plaintiff further alleged
that the judge was acquainted with several defendants and all de-
3A Id.
See Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 60-61 (1973).
,o Decisions prior to the 1974 amendments to § 455 which construed "sufficient"
in § 144 may have been effectively overruled by the amendments. Although § 455
provides only for sua sponte disqualification, see text accompanying note 16 supra, the
amendments have incorporated verbatim the § 144 ground of recusal for personal bias
or prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Prior to 1974, § 144 was the only
statutory provision that included bias against a party as a ground for recusal. Under
the new provisions the judge bears the responsibility of disqualifying himself if his
impartiality may be reasonably questioned. Consequently, a judge may no longer
refuse to disqualify himself simply on the basis that an affidavit is technically insuffi-
cient. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Price v. Johnson, 125 F.2d 806
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 677 (1942). Exactly how § 144 relates to revised § 455
is a question that remains unanswered.
,' United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
370 (1976); see text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
12 See generally FORDHAM Note, supra note 6.
43 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 924 (1976). Although the
effective date of the amendments fell between the close of the trial proceedings and
complete submission of the case to the appellate court, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the amendments applied to the district court proceedings. Id. at 102-03. See note
28 supra.
" 425 F.2d at 101-02. The affidavit further asserted that the judge had not invited
any black lawyers whom he knew at the time of his holding office to join the bar
association. Id.
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
fense counsel, and that the judge had stated that he did not believe
the defendants would intentionally misrepresent any matters related
to the lawsuit. 5 Finally, plaintiff contended that the judge, as a
member of the bar association, had a financial interest in the out-
come of the case since the bar association could be forced to pay
attorneys' fees."8
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial judge's refusal to disqualify
himself in this case was proper. Upon considering the sufficiency of
the affidavit filed under section 144, the court of appeals determined
the applicable test to be whether the facts alleged would "convince a
reasonable man that a bias exists."" The court cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Berger v. United States8 as authority for this test.
The Berger Court, however, required only that the allegations give
"fair support" to the charge of bias. 9 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's stan-
dard requiring convincing proof of bias in fact was not warranted even
under pre-amendment principles.
The Parrish court also considered the effect of the recent section
455 amendments on motions made under section 144. As in Davis, the
Parrish court focused upon the "might reasonably be questioned"
language of section 455(a), and held that the judge's impartiality
could not be reasonably questioned in this case.5" The congressional
intent to overrule the "duty to sit" decisions as well as to replace the
subjective analysis with objective analysis was recognized by the
court.5' Nevertheless, the court found that in this instancethe judge's
behavior did not warrant questioning his impartiality."2
5 Id.
44 Id.
4' Id. at 100, quoting United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973).
19 255 U.S. 22 (1921). Berger v. United States involved the prosecution for espio-
nage of five defendants, three of whom were of German descent. The judge had made
some highly prejudicial statements to the effect that the hearts of German-Americans
were "reeking with disloyalty." Id. at 28. Defendants moved the judge to disqualify
himself, filing an affidavit in compliance with, the predecessor of § 144. The Supreme
Court held that the trial judge may not pass on the truth of the facts alleged, but only
on the sufficiency of such facts. In making this determination, the judge should con-
sider whether the facts "give fair support" of the charge of bias. Id. at 32-34.
' Id. at 33. See note 15 supra.
524 F.2d at 103.
" Id. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
" 524 F.2d at 103-04. Three judges dissented from the en banc decision, urging
that the trial judge's impartiality was not beyond reasonable question in this instance.
Id. at 108-10 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenters noted that the trial
judge showed an inclination to recuse himself but was deterred by his perception of a
"duty to sit," id. at 112, a concept overruled by the 1974 amendments. House Report,
supra note 20, at 6355. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the
judge was financially interested in the disposition of the case. With-
out explaining its reasoning, the appellate court stated that the po-
tential obligation of the Board of Commissioners for attorneys' fees
did not fall within the statutory definition of "financial interest." 53
The court thereafter affirmed the denial of the motion for disqualifi-
cation .
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit decisions, three other courts of
appeals construed the amended disqualification statute. In United
States v. Cowden," the First Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision
not to recuse himself. The defendant had alleged that because the
judge already had presided over the trials of other individuals in-
dicted simultaneously with the defendant, the judge's impartiality
regarding the issues in this trial "might reasonably be questioned."56
The appellate court relied upon the expressed congressional reserva-
tion that litigants are not entitled to have a judge disqualify himself
merely because they fear an adverse decision.57 The court analogized
the knowledge the judge would have gleaned from previous trials to
information that may be gained by a judge in ruling on admissibility
of evidence. 8 The court's decision was based upon a test derived from
language in the legislative history encouraging disqualification where
a reasonable basis exists for doubting a judge's impartiality. 9 In this
' 524 F.2d at 104. The amended statute defines "financial interest" as "ownership
of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or
other active participant in the affairs of a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (Supp.
V 1975).
524 F.2d at 104.
524 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 265. The defendant relied solely on the new language of § 455(a) requiring
a judge to disqualify himself if his impartiality might be open to question. Id.
11 Id.; see House Report, supra note 20, at 6355, which states: "[Iln assessing the
reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each judge must be alert to avoid the
possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid
the consequences of his expected adverse decision."
1 545 F.2d at 265-66. But see United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir.
1976), where in reassigning a case to another judge, the appellate court in dictum
stated that a judge outside the district must be found because the other district judge
"presided at the companion trial... which grows out of the same factual... tran-
sactions."
11 545 F.2d at 265. The pertinent language in the committee report explains: "This
general standard is designed to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting
the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside
over the case." House Report, supra note 20, at 6355.
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case the court determined that such a reasonable basis was not pres-
ent.6"
The Tenth Circuit has taken a more liberal approach in interpret-
ing the statute. In United States v. Ritter," the affiant alleged that
Judge Ritter was biased in favor of opposing counsel, as evidenced by
the judge's statements and actions in the case.6" The court of appeals
was unconvinced that the affiant had shown sufficient bias to amount
to judicial misconduct. However, the court interpreted the broad
language of section 455 and considered all relevant facts to find a
reasonable likelihood that the case might not be tried "with the im-
partiality litigants have a right to expect. . ". .",3 In reaching this
result the court openly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit decision in
Davis.64 The Tenth Circuit asserted that the basic proposition in
545 F.2d at 265-66. Upon amending § 455, Congress apparently left for judicial
determination the question of what standard should be used in determining reasonable
doubt of judicial impartiality. Neither the statute nor its legislative history clearly
indicates whether reasonableness is to be determined from the perspective of the
litigant or from the point of view of an uninvolved observer-the reasonable man. Both
the First Circuit in Cowden and the Fifth Circuit in Parrish held that the uninvolved
observer test was the most appropriate objective standard. Parrish v. Board of
Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975). However, a strong dissent
in Parrish urged that Congress intended the reasonableness test to go to the question
of whether the litigant's fear of bias has a reasonable basis; the test should not inquire
into what a disinterested observer would consider bias. Id. at 108 (Tuttle, J., dissent-
ing). The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976),
appears to have adopted the latter approach. See note 63 infra. This position is advo-
cated in FORDHAM Note, supra note 6, at 148-54; Note, Disqualification for Bias in the
Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1435, 1446-47 (1966).
62 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 The appendix to the court opinion, 540 F.2d at 465, gives examples of the judge's
sarcasm toward the government attorneys as contrasted by the extreme politeness he
showed defense counsel. While arguing to prevent discovery of certain correspondence,
government counsel concluded: "[W]e are extremely concerned that it will curtail the
vigorous enforcement of the anti-trust laws." The court responded, "Well, isn't that
too damn bad. . . ." Id. The government felt that the judge's bias in favor of the
defense attorney could have resulted from counsel's position as chairman of the Board
of Commissioners of the State Bar Association. The Commission was considering ac-
tion on five resolutions which were before it during the trial in question. All five
resolutions dealt with various means of barring Judge Ritter from presiding over fur-
ther cases. See id. at 460 n.2.
11 Id. at 464. The Ritter court impliedly held that the reasonableness standard is
to be measured from the litigant's vantage point and not simply an impartial ob-
server's: "The final question. . .is whether. . .there exists a reasonable likelihood that
the cause will be tried with the impartiality that litigants have a right to expect. . ..
Id. This position conflicts with the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Parrish and the
First Circuit in Cowden. See note 60 supra.
11 540 F.2d at 462. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
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Davis, that disqualification is not required when the bias alleged
pertains to an attorney rather than a party, is not strictly true. 5
Rather, the Ritter court recognized that bias for or against an attor-
ney can result in bias toward a party. In such a situation, the court
concluded that the impartiality of a judge toward a party may reason-
ably be questioned.66
The Fourth Circuit confronted recusal issues involving the 1974
amendments in two cases: In re VEPCO,67 and In re Rodgers.8 In
VEPCO, federal district Judge Warriner raised sua sponte the dis-
qualification issue because of his status as a VEPCO customer. Since
the lawsuit could result in a $70-$100 rebate to Judge Warriner, the
judge reluctantly" recused himself on the basis of the amended sec-
tion 455 and Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and immedi-
ately certified the issue for appeal." He did not believe that his im-
partiality was reasonably questionable under section 455(a), but con-
sidered section 455(b)(4) applicable to his circumstance, character-
ized by "any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding.
7 2
" 540 F.2d at 462. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
540 F.2d at 462.
' 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976).
537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d at 360. VEPCO brought suit against a contractor to recover damages
for faulty fabrication of pump supports in VEPCO's North Anna nuclear power station.
VEPCO had surcharged its customers for an amount which VEPCO now claimed as
an element of its $152 million damage claim. The disqualification problem arose
through a series of conditional occurrences: if VEPCO won the lawsuit (and was
awarded the entire amount claimed, if defendants satisfied the judgment, and if the
Virginia State Corporation Commission decided that VEPCO must disperse to cus-
tomers that part of the award for which ratepayers had been surcharged, then the trial
judge stood to gain between $70 and $100 as a VEPCO customer. Id.
70 Judge Warriner had orally denied the motion (which had been made upon
Warriner's suggestion) and had indicated that a written opinion would follow. Id. at
361. In his written opinion he reversed himself, though only with hesitation: "Although
the Court is of the firm conviction that whatever interest it may have... will not affect
its objectivity. . .,the Court, if err it must, wants to err on the side of the concensus
as articulated in the language of the amended statute." Id. at 363.
11 539 F.2d at 364. Judge Warriner relied upon the Code of Judicial Conduct, the
original § 455, and the amended § 455 in formulating a five step test. The judge
considered whether the court had: (1) a financial interest in the subject matter, (2) a
direct and personal pecuniary interest, (3) a substantial interest, (4) any interest of
such a nature that its impartiality may reasonably be questioned, (5) any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the case. Id. at 361. The third
factor came from the unamended statute and was included because the case had begun
prior to the effective date of the Act. See note 28 supra. The other tests derived jointly
from amended § 455 and the identical Judicial Canon 3C. 539 F.2d at 361-62.
11 539 F.2d at 362, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
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The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the trial judge's application of
the 1974 amendments because the action had commenced prior to
their effective date.73 The appellate court held that this was error in
view of the explicit provision in the Act limiting its application to
proceedings commenced after the effective date.74 However, the court
found that since Canon 3C of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct is
identical to the amended statute, and since the trial judge properly
examined the Canon as a guideline in exercising his discretion," the
consequences of applying the amended statute were insignificant.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit chose to review Judge Warriner's
application of amended section 455 under the guise of Canon 3C.11
The appellate court agreed with Judge Warriner's finding that the
bare expectancy that he might receive a rebate was an "other inter-
est" within the meaning of the statute.78 However, the court strongly
suggested that it considered this interest de minimus," and therefore
not sufficient to require recusal. Judge Warriner's decision was not
considered an abuse of discretion but rather a "failure to exercise his
informed discretion;"80 thus the case was remanded to allow the judge
71 539 F.2d at 363; see note 28 supra.
71 539 F.2d at 366. Under the Fifth Circuit's Davis interpretation of the date
limitation, Judge Warriner's action could have been reviewed under the standards of
the 1974 amendments. See note 28 supra.
15 Traditionally, a trial judge's decision with respect to disqualification is reviewed
on the basis of whether the judge abused the exercise of his sound discretion. Davis v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975). The legislative history
of the 1974 amendments indicates that this standard was intended to continue. House
Report, supra note 20, at 6355.
7' 539 F.2d at 366.
SId.
7' See text accompanying note 72 supra.
7, 539 F.2d at 367-68; see note 80 infra. The court relied upon C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3547, at 365 (1975), for the
proposition that "any other interest" is not an absolute standard, but includes only
interests substantial enough to bring the impartiality of the judge into question. See
also Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct at 66-67 (1973) which ad-
dresses the problem specifically:
Although being a ratepayer does not involve "ownership of a legal or
equitable interest" in the party to whom the judge made such pay-
ments, the Committee concluded that at some point a relationship to
a party as a utility customer. . .should disqualify a judge. The test is
that a judge should disqualify himself if the outcome of the proceeding
could substantially affect his interest as a customer of the utility. ...
539 F.2d at 363-64. In exercising his "informed discretion" on remand, Judge
Warriner may find helpful guidance from the Fourth Circuit's opinion: "when the
possibility of recovering that amount is [so remote]. . .,we doubt that anyone other
than Jimmy the Greek would offer anything for the judge's chance. A reasonable man
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to reconsider."
In re Rodgers" involved only one of the specifically enumerated
grounds 3 for disqualification under amended section 455(b). The de-
fendants based their motion for disqualification upon their intention
to call a former law partner of the judge to testify about events that
had occurred before the judge had left the firm. The former law
partner had represented a client, Pimlico race track, engaged in
activity similar to the defendant's.84 In a brief opinion, the Fourth
Circuit held that the situation fell within amended section 455(b)(2),
which requires a judge to disqualify himself "where in private prac-
tice . . . a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.... .
Although the law partner was not involved in the litigation, his activ-
ity as counsel for Pimlico was viewed by the court as sufficiently
linked to Rodgers as to be a part of the "matter."88 The court held
that since defendants intended to rely on the law partner's testimony
as their primary defense, the testimony necessarily was part of the
"matter in controversy." As the court explained, the "matter" in-
cluded not only the charges brought by the government, but the
defense asserted by defendants as well.8"
Although Congress intended to clarify section 455 to assure uni-
form application, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have
would doubtless prefer a $2 ticket at Churchill Downs on the first Saturday in May."
Id. at 368.
11 Id. at 368-69.
92 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
91 The portion of the statute in question provides in part:
[The judge] shall also disqualify himself. . .(2) where in private
practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has
been a material witness concerning it."
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
8' In re Rodgers was a criminal prosecution under mail fraud and anti-racketeering
statutes. The defendants in the case, as well as the client of the judge's former law
partner, were interested in purchasing Marlboro track. Some of the defendants eventu-
ally acquired the track. In addition, the law partner participated in drafting a bill
consolidating Maryland's one-mile race tracks and defendants were charged with using
unlawful means to secure the passage of this bill. 537 F.2d at 1197-98.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975); see note 83 supra.
AS 537 F.2d at 1198.
Id. The Fourth Circuit might have rested its decision upon other language in §
455(b)(2) as well: ". . .or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning [the
matter]." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). Although the lawyer had not yet been
a witness, counsel clearly intended to call him as a witness.
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developed inconsistent constructions of the statute." The courts con-
cur without exception that section 455(a) replaces the subjective dis-
cretionary standard with an objective reasonableness standard.89
However, they disagree as to whether the judge should apply this
reasonable man test from the position of the impartial observer or
from the more sensitive viewpoint of the litigant." The First and Fifth
Circuits in Cowden and Parrish applied the impartial observer test,9
while the Tenth Circuit in Ritter and the dissent in Parrish viewed
reasonableness from the affiant's position.
The courts also have exhibited various degrees of sensitivity to
preventing the appearance of impropriety; the Fifth Circuit failed to
mention the appearance standard,93 while the Tenth Circuit based its
decision upon it. 4 These same two circuits have expressed contradic-
tory views as to whether an allegation of bias toward an attorney is
sufficient to require recusal or whether the allegation must be di-
rected specifically toward a "party." The Fifth Circuit held that
"party" status was necessary,"5 while the Tenth Circuit held that bias
against an attorney was sufficient to render reasonably questionable
the judge's impartiality toward a party.
The issue of judicial acquaintance with counsel and witnesses was
raised in Parrish and Rodgers, and different analyses again produced
inconsistent results. The Fourth Circuit in Rodgers stretched the sta-
tutory language to cover the circumstances and to require recusal,
while the Fifth Circuit in Parrish strictly construed section 455 and
held the judge's friendship with counsel and witnesses was not deter-
minative. 8 Finally, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits analyzed
See House Report, supra note 20, at 6352.
" See United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976); United States
v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1976); In re VEPCO, 539 F.2d 357, 362 (4th Cir.
1976); Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1975);
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975).
90 See notes, 60 & 63 supra.
11 United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976); Parrish v. Board of
Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1975).
12 United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir. 1976); Parrish v. Board of
Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 108 (5th Cir. 1975) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
" See text accompanying notes 42-43, 50 supra.
" See text accompanying note 63 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra. The Tenth Circuit stated in Ritter
that "bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly result in bias toward the
party. Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned in relationship to the party." 540 F.2d at 462.
" See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
s See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
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"financial" or "other" interests differently in Parrish and VEPCO,
although both achieved the same practical result in this context.99
Consequently, despite the recognition by all four circuits that the
statutory standard has been broadened,' 0 the failure to achieve con-
sistent interpretations and results indicates that little has been clari-
fied by the amendments.
Numerous commentators are dissatisfied with the present recusal
procedures and advocate a change to an automatic disqualification
system.'0 An automatic disqualification process apparently was the
goal of Congress in enacting the original recusal legislation.'," In 1921,
" See text accompanying notes 53-54, 78-79 supra; note 79 supra. In Parrish, the
court held that the judge's membership in the bar association, coupled with the possi-
bility that the bar association might have to pay attorney's fees, was not a "financial
interest" within the meaning of the statute. 524 F.2d at 104. The Fourth Circuit held
in VEPCO that the ratepayer judge probably did have an "interest," but that the
interest was so small that it probably should be considered de minimus. 539 F.2d at
367-68.
'" Two district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit also reflect the broadened
statutory standard, and indeed, seem to be paradigm cases of the proper operation of
the amended disqualification statute. In Spires v. Hearst Corp., 420 F. Supp. 304 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), the plaintiff urged recusal on the basis that defendant's newspaper had run
an article on the judge which was personally very complimentary. This, plaintiff as-
serted, was sufficient to bring the judge's impartiality reasonably into question. The
trial judge found that he had no such alleged bias or prejudice, but disqualified himself
because of a possible appearance of impropriety. Similarly, the district judge in Smith
v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 420 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1976), recused himself when he
discovered that an attorney who had represented him in the past had become asso-
ciated with the law firm representing the plaintiffs. The judge expressly found that he
had no personal bias, personal knowledge of evidentiary facts, or personal interest in
the proceedings, but nonetheless found that his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
101 See authorities cited in note 7 supra.
,0 The original purpose of the recusal statutes is indicated by the remarks of
Representative Cullop of Indiana in reply to the question of whether the statute al-
lowed district judges discretion to determine the sufficiency of affidavits:
Mr. Cullop: . . .no, it provides that the judge shall proceed no fur-
ther with the case. The filing of the affidavit deprives him of jurisdic-
tion in the case.
Mr. Cox: . . .Suppose the affidavit sets out certain reasons which
may exist in the mind of the party making the affidavit; suppose the
judge to whom the affidavit is submitted says that it is not a statutory
reason? In other words, does it not leave it to the discretion of the
judge?
Mr. Cullop: No; it expressly provides that the judge shall proceed
no further.
46 CONG. Rc. 2627 (1911), quoted in Orfield, Recusation of Federal Judges, 17 BUFFALO
L. REv. 799, 803-04 (1968).
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however, the landmark case of Berger v. United States' 3 required the
sitting judge to pass on the sufficiency of the facts in the affidavit of
disqualification.' 4 Congress revised the statutes in 1948, but made no
changes intended to overrule Berger; Congress apparently acquiesced
to the Supreme Court's statutory construction in Berger. 05 The idea
of automatic recusal in federal courts was not seriously considered
again until the proposed revisions of the statutes in the early 1970's.
Between 1970 and 1973 Senator Birch Bayh twice proposed
amending section 144 to provide litigants a peremptory challenge
directed to judicial disqualification. 00 Congress, however, enacted
only the revision of section 455 and left section 144 unaltered. 7 Advo-
cates of the peremptory challenge have criticized that congressional
decision, and have emphasized problems under pre-amendment law
or ill considered decisions under the amendments, as evidence of the
present system's failure to assure an impartial tribunal.' 8 In addi-
tion, nineteen states now have peremptory challenge statutes or the
equivalent established in their state judiciaries."9 Use of the peremp-
255 U.S. 22 (1921).
"o The Berger Court held that allegations in an affidavit for disqualification must
be accepted as true, but that the judge must pass upon the sufficiency of the allega-
tions to determine whether bias could be established from the facts alleged. Id. at 32.
"1 The Supreme Court has explained with regard to statutory construction that
the "failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the
enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construc-
tion as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction
is the correct one." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) (in reference
to Sherman Act).
2U Senator Bayh's proposal to amend § 144 provided in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files
a timely affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
Frank, supra note 5, at 66, quoting the proposed Bayh revision of 28 U.S.C. § 144. The
proposal differs from the present statute's language only in that the proposal does not
require the affidavit to be sufficient. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). Senator Bayh indi-
cated that his proposal was intended to provide a peremptory-type challenge: "my
bill's allegation of bias . . . is clearly pro forma." 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at
12-15.
1O7 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V. 1975), amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
" See authorities cited in note 7 supra.
The nineteen states with disqualification or change of venue devices which
allow automatic transfer of a case to a new judge are: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyo-
ming. 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 65. (Statement of John P. Frank).
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tory challenge system on the state level has been lauded by its propo-
nents as an indication of the feasibility of the system in federal
courts."0
Advocates of automatic recusal believe that objections to such a
scheme are sufficiently answered by years of "successful" state expe-
rience with the system."' However, surveys conducted in states hav-
ing such systems have produced statistics to the contrary. In Califor-
nia, questionnaires were sent to superior court judges across the state
to elicit feedback on the automatic challenge system. 2 In reply to the
question of whether the system was abused, only seven of ninety-
three superior court judges who answered the question responded that
the "peremptory challenge statute is not abused."" 3 The California
system is similar to that proposed by Senator Bayh. A litigant need
merely allege bias or prejudice and the judge must immediately dis-
qualify himself from that controversy."' Each party is permitted one
such challenge per lawsuit." 5
In addition to the superior court judges' general responses of dis-
satisfaction with peremptory challenge abuses, the Calfornia survey
reported other problems with the system. Several judges complained
that peremptory disqualifications were being made "purely for rea-
sons of trial strategy" rather than because of possible judicial preju-
dice.I" Other judges were concerned about the accumulation of such
motions against them, particularly since they have no opportunity to
deny the allegations."'7 The survey further reported excessive and
persistent use of the disqualification procedure by certain lawyers
against certain judges."8 Finally, the most serious abuse cited was the
,,0 Id. at 40-65.
In the Senate Hearings on the Bayh bill, Mr. Frank presented the committee
with letters from chief justices in 8 states in which automatic disqualification systems
exist. Each judge highly praised the system and told how satisfied his respective state
bar was with the system. Id. at 40.
"2 The survey was conducted by the Judicial Council of California. The Report is
reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 54.
,,3 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 54 (1970 Report of the Judicial Council of
California). Of the remaining judges, 33 indicated that the procedure was abused for
the purpose of judgeshopping, 18 replied that it was used as form of continuance, 14
found it being used to avoid an unknown judge, 7 thought it was being used for
retaliatory purposes, and 7 suggested it was being used for blanket challenges. Id.
.' CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1977).
"1 Id.
,, 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 53 (1970 Report of the Judicial Council of
California). See note 110 supra.




"widespread practice of circumventing the statutory procedure by
informing the presiding judge or his calendar clerk that if a certain
judge or any of several judges is assigned to the trial of the case he
will be challenged at the commencement of trial.""' In this manner
the shrewd attorney could circumvent the statutory limitation of one
challenge per lawsuit and effectively choose his favorite judge by
threatening to challenge whichever judges were named by the clerk.
Thus, the California challenge system seems to be used as a proce-
dural device to effect delay, to procure sympathetic judges, or per-
haps to avoid judges whose attitudes are unknown.' 0
Another survey made in Oregon also indicated abuse of a peremp-
tory challenge system. The Oregon automatic disqualification proce-
dure differs from the Bayh proposal and the California scheme, in
that it allows each side two peremptory challenges per lawsuit.'
During the thirteen year period' covered by the survey, one firm
challenged a single judge 428 times, making that judge the target for
98.8% of the firm's total disqualification motions.'1 Other Oregon
firms followed a similar pattern. This practice of wholly avoiding a
particular judge, an abuse also reported in California,'2 could cause
considerable administrative delay in the federal court system. Far
fewer federal judges preside in each geographical region than state
judges, and peremptory challenges could result in greater travel and
inconvenience to replacement judges. The smaller one and two judge
districts might find such abuse especially burdensome.
The objection that abuse would accompany the institution of a
federal peremptory system is not the only obstacle to its enactment,
-however, for a question remains concerning the constitutionality of
peremptory procedures. Upon enactment of section 144 in 1911, one
court determined that construction of the statute to permit peremp-
tory challenges would render the statute unconstitutional.' 6 The ar-
gument, based upon a separation of powers theory, asserted that a
11 Id.
,, See note 109 supra.
"' OR. REv. STAT. §§ 14.250-270 (1975).
'2 The study covered the period from May 2, 1955 to July 1, 1968. Oregon Project,
supra note 3, at 378.
" Id. at 381.
" Id. at 381-83. Individual attorneys also utilized the disqualification procedures
to avoid particular judges. Id.
"I See text accompanying note 118 supra; note 113 supra.
12' Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 996 (M.D. Ala. 1912). Cf. Austin v:
Lambert, 11 Cal. 2d 73, 77, 77 P.2d 849, 852 (1938); Diehl v. Crump, 72 Okla. 108, 110,
179 P. 4, 6 (1919) (state peremptory challenge statutes held unconstitutional).
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peremptory system vests judicial power in the litigant.ln Although no
federal courts have held a peremptory challenge statute constitu-
tional,'2 several state courts have so held.2 9 Some state court deci-
sions holding their respective statutes constitutional, however, have
directed their analysis to the specific statutes in a manner that would
render a "pure" peremptory statute unconstitutional. 3 ° These deci-
sions essentially have held that peremptory challenge statutes would
be unconstitutional but for the requirement that an affidavit alleging
bias be filed. 3' But since the. affidavit requirement is clearly pro
forma in some states anyway, the "but for" rationale supporting the
constitutionality of the statute is tenuous. Thus, the constitutionality
of peremptory challenge legislation is not completely settled.32
Advocates of a new attempt to amend section 144 to create a
peremptory challenge statute contend that the public's lack of con-
fidence in the judiciary, as well as the reluctance of judges to construe
recusal statutes broadly, require such a change.1 13 However, a per-
'2 The court in Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 996 (M.D. Ala. 1912),
stated that § 144 operates to arm the litigant with the judicial power of the court,
leaving the litigant the absolute power to decide that a judge is disqualified.
1 Since the Berger decision in 1926, no federal courts have had occasion to ques-
tion whether § 144 was a peremptory statute. Thus, federal courts have not had to
determine the constitutionality of a federal peremptory statute.
I" The landmark case was U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 P. 1074 (1926), which
held that automatic disqualification upon filing an affidavit does not raise separation
of powers problems resulting from legislative infringement of the judicial province. The
court analogized the disqualification of a judge on the mere fact of objection to a
peremptory challenge of a juror, which is within the legislative "necessary and proper"
power. Id. at 1076. See Hulme v. Woleslagel, 208 Kan. 385, 493 P.2d 541 (1972);
Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alas. 1969); State ex rel. Wulle v.
Dirlam, 28 Ohio C.C. 69 (1906); State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy,
30 Mont. 529, 77 P. 312 (1904).
11 See Hulme v. Woleslagel, 208 Kan. 385, 493 P.2d 541 (1972); Channel Flying,
Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alas. 1969); see also U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77,
245 P. 1074 (1926).
131 Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alas. 1969). Accord, Hulme
v. Woleslagel, 208 Kan. 385, 493 P.2d 541 (1972). A possible contrary argument can
be made that in requiring a judge automatically to disqualify himself upon allegations
of bias or prejudice, the judge is unable to deny or refute the allegations. As a result,
the judge is denied due process and is left without recourse to remove a possible taint
on his integrity. See text accompanying note 117 supra. This argument would favor a
"pure" peremptory system.
'1 More subtle intra-governmental pressures also should be considered. The reluc-
tance of Congress to impose even constitutional restraints on the operation of a coordi-
nate governmental branch may be a major, though unpronounced, reason for the
legislature's hesitation to adopt a peremptory system. See FORDHAM Note, supra note
6, 161 n.158.
I Id. at 159-61.
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
emptory challenge statute may well cause more problems than it
solves. The chief goals of any disqualification statute are to assure
due process of law and to foster confidence in the judiciary. 3 The
ability of a peremptory statute to better attain these goals is ques-
tionable. Due process is threatened by delays13 resulting from the
abuses that apparently accompany such a procedure, 3' and public
confidence is likely to be further eroded by the use of this important
due process safeguard as a mere instrument of trial strategy.'37 Creat-
ing a procedural formality that facilitates judge-shopping and delay
can only exacerbate the public's already dim view"' of the legal
process.
Congress implicitly recognized the need to improve public confid-
ence in the judiciary and legal system by amending section 455 and
creating an appearance of impartiality test. However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Davis decision was an extremely narrow reading of this statute
that was intended to broaden substantially the existing disqualifica-
tion standards. The Fifth Circuit failed sufficiently to accommodate
congressional intent in amending section 455. The Davis court's inter-
pretation of the amendments alone, however, does not warrant dis-
missing the appearance of impropriety test as unworkable. 39 The
Fourth and Tenth Circuits have demonstrated that the present legis-
lation is suited both to according litigants due process and to avoiding
situations which may be suspect in the public eye. The eventual
solution for eliminating the inconsistencies in statutory interpreta-
tion and effectively implementing congressional intent is uniform
federal court application of the 1974 amendments in a manner similar
,to the construction found in Ritter. The Tenth Circuit in Ritter based
its decision ordering disqualification on the possible appearance of
partiality, even though the court explicitly found bias could not be
'31 See Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias - The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REv. 749, 764 (1973).
"I Undue delay has been held to lead to a greater denial of justice than a judge
sitting on a case in which he has an interest. In re Sime, 22 F. Cas. 145 (C.C.D. Cal.
1872) (No. 12,860).
2u See note 113 supra; text accompanying note 120 supra.
' See text accompanying note 116 supra.
' One source has described local courthouses as "a haven for vagrants sleeping
in corridors, incompetent lawyers and bail bondsmen swarming about like vultures,
and hack political appointees clothed in the robes of justice destroying lives through
prejudice, whim, and limited legal ability." L. DowNiE, JUSTICE DENIED 16 (1972).
Additionally, Roscoe Pound pointed to delay as the greatest factor for discontent of
the public in the courts. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 40 AM. L. Rav. 729 (1906).
"I' See, e.g., FORDHAM Note, supra note 6.
1977] 1221
1222 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
inferred from the affiant's allegations."' This appearance of impar-
tiality test created by the 1974 amendments is not prone to the
abuse accompanying a peremptory system and, properly applied,
insures due process and public confidence in the judiciary.
MARK T. COBERLY
" See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
